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ABSTRACT 
 
Power Grids are one of the most intricate systems and greatly affect economic, political, 
and social aspects of contemporary life.  A well-operated power system consists of many control 
devices and protection methods to prevent the interruption of power to consumers.  However, 
such systems are highly vulnerable to severe events; for instance, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, 
mal-function of control devices, etc.  The occurrence of these odd events may lead to cascading 
failures, which are prominent contributors to blackouts.    
 This paper focuses on the development of a cascade model in a distribution network 
using Newton-Raphson’s power flow method to study the impact of random line failures on 
other lines in the system.  The random line failures are initiated to mimic the occurrence of 
severe events.  The objective of this study is to collect data which includes the probability of a 
line failing due to the failure of another line.  This probability data set is used to identify lines in 
a system that are most vulnerable to a threat and to illustrate interconnectivity of the lines using 
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Cascade Failures can have enormous economic, political, and social ramifications and lead to  
catastrophic power system failures.  Severe events, such as natural disasters, cyber-attacks, and 
malfunction of control devices are few of the many events that may initiate the cascading 
failures.  As mentioned in [10], five of the major blackouts that have occurred in the USA are a 
consequence of faults, whereas the remaining are a result of natural disasters.   
 
Power grids are typically designed to meet N-1 contingency.  N-1 Contingency is a criterion 
which indicates that a single component failure should not cause the failure of another.  This 
means that it takes at least two concurrent faults to initiate a cascading sequence of failures [11].  
Therefore, in this paper we developed a model to initiate multiple element failures to analyze 
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1.2 Objectives 
 
The Paper focuses on developing a cascading power failure model using Newton-Raphson’s 
power flow method to identify critical components in a distribution network that are most 
vulnerable to severe events or attacks.  Below is a list of further core objectives that are a result 
from the identification of the critical components in a power system: 
 
Ø Creation of a probability matrix to analyze the probability of a line failure due to failing 
of randomly disconnected branches 
 
Ø Capturing the interactions among the components using the cascade model 
 
Ø Illustrating a logical network of interactions among the components using influence-
based graphs 
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METHODOLOGY 
2.1 IEEE 30 Bus System  
 
A power grid consists of nodes and branches and can be represented by a directed graph G(N, L), 
where N denotes the set of nodes and L denotes the set of lines or branches [1].  In this paper, we 
use the IEEE 30 Bus System as a benchmark to develop the cascade model. The model and 
graphs are generated using power system simulations in MATPOWER [5].  The figure below is 
an illustration of the system where each node is represented by a dot and each branch is 
represented by a line connecting the nodes.  
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2.2 Cascade Failure Model 
 
Every line in a system has an emergency rating value which dictates the power flow in a 
functioning system.  In an event where the power flow exceeds the line’s emergency rating, 
protective devices are initiated to remove the lines out of service to prevent overloading.  The 
cascading failure algorithm is developed based on this deterministic rule.  The power flow of the 
line is computed as follows, where fl is the power flow, Sik and Ski are the apparent power flows 






                 (1)                                                                                      
 
To mimic the occurrence of a severe event or attack, we randomly disconnect two branches from 
the system to initiate the cascading process.  As a result of these initial failures, the network 
topology of the power grid changes and may lead to a further division of the connected 
components, which we refer to as islands.  After that, if the individual islands have supply and 
demand nodes, the island is considered alive provided that supply and demand are balanced.  
Following [7], the supply and demand rule used is shedding and curtailing: “the amount of power 
supply and demand are reduced at all nodes by a common factor.  If the total active power supply 
is more than the active power demand in a connected component, the active power outputs of 
generators are curtailed.  On the other hand, if the total active power supply is not sufficient to 
serve the total active power demand, load shedding is performed to balance the supply and 
demand within the connected component.”  Lastly, the deterministic rule is applied to find 
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2.3 Pseudocode  
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
3.1 Cascading Stage Probabilities  
When a pair of lines are disconnected from the system, the effect varies in the propagation of 
failures.  To accurately identify the most vulnerable lines in the IEEE 30 bus system, 
approximately all possible pair of combinations were used as the random removal process.  The 
system which consists of 41 branches roughly accounted for 817 different pair of combinations.  
Below are multiple tables that show the probabilities and number of occurrences of line failures 
per cascading stages after the removal of all possible pair of branch combinations.  It is to be 
noted that there are only four tables because the maximum number of cascading stages that 
occurred were only four.    
 
Branches Number of 
Occurrences 
Probability 
10 497 0.608323133 
[10;22] 30 0.036719706 
[10;22;29] 1 0.00122399 
[10;22;30] 4 0.004895961 
[10;22;30;31] 1 0.00122399 
[10;22;32] 1 0.00122399 
[10;24] 1 0.00122399 
[10;28;32] 1 0.00122399 
[10;29] 145 0.17747858 
[10;29;30] 11 0.013463892 
[10;29;31;32] 2 0.00244798 
[10;29;32] 29 0.035495716 
[10;30] 47 0.05752754 
[10;30;35] 1 0.00122399 
[10;32] 3 0.003671971 
[10;34;35;37;38;39] 1 0.00122399 
[22;40;41] 1 0.00122399 
29 1 0.00122399 
[29;32;40] 1 0.00122399 
[29;40] 2 0.00244798 
[29;40;41] 3 0.003671971 
36x1 double 1 0.00122399 
38x1 double 1 0.00122399 
[30;40;41] 2 0.00244798 
[31;32;33;35;40] 1 0.00122399 
40 4 0.004895961 
[40;41] 25 0.030599755 
Table 3-1:  Probability Matrix Cascading Stage 1 
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Branches Number of 
Occurrences 
Probability 
[] 79 0.096695226 
[17;20;32;40] 1 0.00122399 
[21;22;23;30;31;40] 2 0.00244798 
[21;22;30;31;40] 1 0.00122399 
[21;26;29;31;40;41] 1 0.00122399 
[21;30;31;40] 2 0.00244798 
[22;23;30;31;40] 2 0.00244798 
[22;28;40] 1 0.00122399 
[22;30;31;32;40] 1 0.00122399 
[22;30;31;32;40;41] 1 0.00122399 
[22;30;31;40] 19 0.023255814 
[22;40] 1 0.00122399 
[23;25;29;32;40;41] 1 0.00122399 
[28;31;40;41] 1 0.00122399 
[28;40] 20 0.024479804 
[28;40;41] 9 0.011015912 
29 1 0.00122399 
[29;40] 5 0.006119951 
[29;40;41] 12 0.014687882 
[30;31] 1 0.00122399 
[30;31;32] 1 0.00122399 
[30;31;40] 3 0.003671971 
[30;32;33;35;40] 1 0.00122399 
[30;40] 2 0.00244798 
[30;40;41] 3 0.003671971 
[31;32;33;35;40] 17 0.020807834 
[31;33;35;40] 9 0.011015912 
[31;40] 3 0.003671971 
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Branches Number of 
Occurrences 
Probability 
[] 778 0.952264382 
12 2 0.00244798 
[19;21;30;31;32] 2 0.00244798 
21 1 0.00122399 
[21;22;30;31] 1 0.00122399 
[21;30;31] 2 0.00244798 
[21;30;31;32] 2 0.00244798 
[21;31] 1 0.00122399 
[22;23;24;25;28] 1 0.00122399 
[22;23;30;31] 2 0.00244798 
[22;23;30;31;32] 2 0.00244798 
[22;30;31] 2 0.00244798 
[22;30;31;32] 3 0.003671971 
28 4 0.004895961 
31 4 0.004895961 
[31;33;35] 8 0.009791922 
32 1 0.00122399 
35 1 0.00122399 
Table 3-3: Probability Matrix Cascading Stage 3 
 
 
Branches Number of 
Occurrences 
Probability 
[] 813 0.995104039 
12 2 0.00244798 
21 2 0.00244798 
Table 3-4:  Probability Matrix Cascading Stage 4 
        
After observing and analyzing the data, it is apparent that branch 10 is most vulnerable to be 
attacked following the random initial failures and branches 40 and 41 are most likely to fail in 
the event branch 10 fails.  This data provides useful information because it allows us to take 
precautionary measures to prevent failures from occurring.  Also, the data helps with future 
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3.2 Influence Graph 
 
“Given a larger number of sequences, we can statistically describe how successive pairs of lines 
interact in the set of cascades by making a directed graph called the line interaction graph” [2].  
In this graph, every line and the consecutively failed line is given a weight based on the 
probability matrix in the tables above.  For instance, given that almost any random pair failures 
cause line 10 to be disconnected, the probability of line 10 failing given any single line failure is 
one.  Similarly, all other links are given weights to generate a line interaction graph.  Below is an 
illustration of the graph where each dot represents a branch and each line represents a link 
between the branches.  
 
 
Figure 3-1: Line Interaction Graph 
Analyzing the above graph, we can see that the links become darker as you center in.  This 
shows that the more vulnerable lines are grouped in the center as there are more links and as you 
stretch out, there are less links; hence, the outer lines are less vulnerable.   
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4.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
A cascading model was developed using MATPOWER power simulation to identify vulnerable 
lines in the IEEE 30 bus system.  The cascading algorithm used was based on the deterministic 
outage rule where an initial set of line failures causes other lines to fail due to overloading.  
Various initial failures impact the prorogation of cascading stages and determines subnetworks 
or islands before yielding a final result.   
 
This model can be used effectively to analyze the strength of a power network to identify causes 
that may lead to damaging of the system.  It also allows us to become more proactive because we 
can prevent catastrophic failures.  Furthermore, it allows for further improvements in the grid as 
in installations of energy storage devices at vulnerable locations to at least mitigate the failure 
from spreading.  This will allow us to save economic, political, and social uproar.   
 
In future work, we will: 
• Include into the model nodes with Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), Energy Storage 
Systems (ESS), and microgrids. 
• Further develop the visualization and presentation of the Influence Graphs. 
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